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I.

Introduction
The election of Donald Trump as President has started to impact the legal landscape.
There have been substantive changes already reflected in rulings of administrative agencies with
the National Labor Relations Board reversing a decision on the standard for determining
bargaining units and the Department of Education changing course on Title IX guidance. Other
changes may be on the horizon with potentially substantial modifications to the law governing
unionization of faculty and graduate students in the private sector and the constitutionality of
agency fee in the public sector. Finally, the new political and social environment has led to an
increase in the harassment and discipline of faculty members, resulting in First Amendment and
other legal challenges.
The most significant change may arise in the Supreme Court. In 2016 the Supreme Court
accepted a case challenging the constitutionality of agency fees in the public sector. (See
Friedrichs infra.) The Court appeared poised to find agency fees unconstitutional when Justice
Antonin Scalia died. Left with only eight justices, the Court issued a one sentence 4-4 decision
that upheld the lower court’s decision and the status quo on agency fee. Trump appointed Justice
Neil Gorsuch to fill Scalia’ seat, and he will likely adopt a conservative position. The issue is now
before the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
February 26, 2018 and the argument went largely as expected. Because none of the justices
appeared to depart from their expected position, the oral argument reinforced the view that the
Court will likely rule that the collection of agency fees in the public section is unconstitutional.
In the private sector, the coming change in the makeup of the Board will likely bring into
question the future of the Board’s rulings in a number of important cases. With new appointments
now filling two of three vacancies on the National Labor Relations Board and the likelihood that
the third vacancy will be filled by another conservative nominee, the Board may revisit some of
its important rulings regarding faculty, particularly its Pacific Lutheran University (2014) decision
on the test used to determine whether religiously-affiliated institutions are exempt from NLRB
jurisdiction, and its Columbia University (2016) decision that graduate student employees
(teaching assistants and research assistants) have the right to unionize.
The increase in scrutiny of faculty actions, and the attendant online harassment of faculty,
has also created new legal challenges. In some instances, faculty have been disciplined for their
activities, drawing First Amendment or contract based challenges, and these cases are winding
their way through the courts.

5
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II.

First Amendment and Speech Rights
A. Garcetti / Citizen Speech
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014)
In this Supreme Court case the Court held unanimously that a public employee’s speech
that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject to First
Amendment protection. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Lane did not speak
as a citizen when he was subpoena’d to testify in a criminal case, finding that Eleventh Circuit
relied on too broad a reading of Garcetti. Garcetti does not transform citizen speech into employee
speech simply because the speech involves subject matter acquired in the course of employment.
The crucial component of Garcetti then, is, whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”
Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a
program operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC). Lane in the course of his
duties as director conducted an audit of the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne
Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative who was on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for
work. As a result Lane terminated Schmitz’ employment. Federal authorities soon indicted
Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft. Lane was subpoenaed and testified regarding the events
that led to the termination of Schmitz at CITY. Schmitz was later convicted. Steve Franks, then
CACC’s president, terminated Lane along with 28 other employees under the auspices of financial
difficulties. Soon afterward, however, “Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those
of Lane and one other employee”. Lane sued alleging that Franks had violated the First
Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.
The District Court granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the
individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed, holding
that Lane spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because he acted in accordance to his official duties
when he investigated and terminated Schmitz’ employment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals as to “whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employment
consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary
job responsibilities”.
The Court held that Lane’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court
explained that under Garcetti, the initial inquiry was into whether the case involved speech as a
citizen, which may trigger First Amendment protection, or speech as an employee, which would
not trigger such protection. In Lane the Court provided a more detailed explanation of employee
versus citizen speech, and expanded the range of speech that is protected. The Court explained that
6
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“the mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public
employment does not transform that speech into employee--rather than citizen--speech. The
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” And the Court found that
“Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a citizen.”
The Court further determined that Lane’s speech was protected under the First
Amendment. First, Lane’s speech about the corruption of a public program is “obviously” a matter
of public concern and further that testimony within a judicial proceeding is a “quintessential
example” of citizen speech. Second, the employer could not demonstrate any interest in limiting
this speech to promote the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees or
“that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, or privileged information.”
The Court held that Franks could not be sued in his individual capacity on the basis of
qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, courts should not award damages against a government
official in their personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,”
and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Because of the
ambiguity of Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of the conduct, the right was not “clearly
established” and thus the test unsatisfied to defeat qualified immunity. Lane’s speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection, but Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. As a result of this case
the right is clearly established and is now the standard.
B. Faculty Speech
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014)
In this important decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinforced the
First Amendment protections for academic speech by faculty members. (Important note, a
previous opinion by the Ninth Circuit in this case dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729
F.3d 1011 was withdrawn and substituted with this opinion.) Adopting an approach advanced in
AAUP’s amicus brief, the court emphasized the seminal importance of academic speech.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Garcetti analysis did not apply to "speech related to
scholarship or teaching,” and therefore the First Amendment could protect this speech even when
undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher and professor.
Professor Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University (WSU) WSU
in 1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999. Demers taught journalism and mass communications
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication. Starting in 2008,
Demers took issue with certain practices and policies of the School of Communication. Demers
began to voice his criticism of the college and authored two publications entitled 7-Step Plan for
Improving the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower
of Babel. Demers sued the university and claimed that the university retaliated against him by
lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations and subjected him to an unwarranted
7
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internal audit in response to his open criticisms of administration decisions and because of his
publications.
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim on the ground that Demers
made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410 (2006). Demers appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The AAUP joined with the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression to file an amicus brief in support of
Demers. The amicus brief argued that academic speech was not governed by the Garcetti analysis,
but instead was governed by the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
US 563 (1968). The Ninth Circuit agreed and issued a ruling that vigorously affirmed that the First
Amendment protects the academic speech of faculty members.
The Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti does not apply to "speech related to scholarship or
teaching" and reaffirmed that “Garcetti does not – indeed, consistent with the First Amendment,
cannot – apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’
of a teacher and professor.”
The Ninth Circuit held specifically that the 7-Step plan was “related to scholarship or
teaching” within the meaning of Garcetti because “it was a proposal to implement a change at the
Murrow School that, if implemented, would have substantially altered the nature of what was
taught at the school, as well as the composition of the faculty that would teach it.” The court thus
considered whether the Demers pamphlet was protected under the Pickering balancing test.
Academic employee speech is protected under the First Amendment by the Pickering analysis if
it is a (1) matter of public concern, and (2) outweighs the interest of the state in promoting
efficiency of service. The court held that the pamphlet addressed a matter of “public concern”
within the meaning of Pickering because it was broadly distributed and “contained serious
suggestions about the future course of an important department of WSU.” The case was remanded
to the district court, however, to determine (1) whether WSU had a “sufficient interest in
controlling” the circulation of the plan, (2) whether the circulation was a “substantial motivating
factor in any adverse employment action, and (3) whether the University would have taken the
action in the absence of protected speech.
Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., 669 F. Appx 297 (5th Cir. 2017); Wetherbe v. Goebel,
No. 07-16-00179-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1676 (Mar. 6, 2018)
In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that a professor’s public statements opposing tenure were
protected by the First Amendment. Professor James Wetherbe sued his employer, Texas Tech
University, and the current and former deans of the business school where he taught. Wetherbe
claimed that the University and the deans violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him
for publicly criticizing tenure in the academy. The district court granted Defendants' motion to
dismiss, holding that Wetherbe's speech was not protected by the First Amendment as it did not
involve a matter of public concern because "[t]enure is a benefit that owes its existence to, and is
generally found only in the context of, government employment."
8
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Wetherbe’s statements criticizing
tenure were protected. The court explained that "Whether speech addresses a matter of public
concern is to be 'determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.'" As to the
content of the speech, the court found that “Because these articles focus on the systemic impact of
tenure, not Wetherbe's own job conditions, the content of the speech indicates that the speech
involves a matter of public concern.” As to the form and context of the speech, the court
emphasized the publicity and media coverage surrounding Wetherbe’s statements, and that the
speech consisted of articles Wetherbe published in various media outlets. The court also rejected
arguments by the university that Wetherbe’s speech was made in the course of performing his job,
as there was no reason to infer that writing articles on tenure or speaking to the press are part of
Wetherbe's job duties.
By contrast, in an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had found that the First Amendment did
not protect Wetherbe's decision to reject tenure or his personal views on tenure. Wetherbe v. Smith,
593 F. App'x 323, 327-29 (5th Cir. 2014). In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that because
Wetherbe’s statements had been made solely to university employees during the course of his
interview for a position, and had not been made publicly, they were not speech on a matter of
public concern and therefore were not protected by the First Amendment. These two cases together
demonstrate that it is not just the content of the speech that is important, but the forum and audience
at which the speech is directed.
In Wetherbe v. Goebel, No. 07-16-00179-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1676 (Mar. 6, 2018),
a parallel case before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District Court of Texas at Amarillo, the
sole issue on this appeal was whether Wetherbe’s speech was a matter of public concern. The court
reversed the dismissal of this state law claim and remanded the case back to the trial court further
proceedings finding, “Because the continued value of academic tenure was a matter of public
concern, conceptually distinct from any speech related to Appellant’s prior litigation or disputes
with the university.”
Buchanan v. Alexander, et al., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4479 (M.D. LA Jan. 10, 2018)
In this case, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with
prejudice. Plaintiff, Teresa Buchanan, a tenured professor at Louisiana State University (LSU),
alleged that LSU infringed upon her freedom of speech, academic freedom, and procedural and
substantive due process rights when LSU’s Board of Supervisors terminated her employment after
finding that her remarks about marriage and sex to students—made while training students for
preschool to third-grade instruction—violated the university’s Policy Statements on Sexual
Harassment. Plaintiff also brought a facial and as-applied constitutional challenge to LSU’s sexual
harassment policy, arguing that it was overbroad and lacked an objective test for offensiveness.
The court found that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims failed either because they were timebarred or because qualified immunity protected Defendants’ objectively reasonable actions,
notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff failed to show that her remarks were protected by the
9
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academic freedom exception to Garcetti and did not involve a matter of public concern. The court
found, “Plaintiff has utterly failed to present any summary judgment evidence establishing how
her conduct and language related in any way to assignments, instruction, and education of
preschool and elementary teachers.” The court further found that LSU’s sexual harassment policy
was constitutional, both facially and as-applied to Plaintiff, since its language required conduct to
be objectively severe and examples provided in the policy illustrated that conduct must be
sufficiently severe and pervasive. Last, the court found that Plaintiff was afforded procedural and
substantive due process to satisfy constitutional standards leading up to her termination.
C. Union Speech
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. College, 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014), and No. 13 C
7950 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016)
This case arose from the termination of Robin Meade, an adjunct professor and active union
officer at Moraine Valley Community College, who was summarily dismissed after she sent a
letter criticizing her college’s treatment of its adjunct faculty. The case resulted in several
substantive decisions from the district court and one from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In the appeals court case, the Seventh Circuit greatly enhanced constitutional protection for
outspoken critics of public college and university administrators. It reinforced and enhanced recent
and congenial decisions in two other federal circuits in cases from Washington (Demers) and
North Carolina (Adams). The court specifically relied on a sympathetic view of the Supreme
Court’s judgment in the Garcetti case, expressly invoking the justices’ “reservation” of free speech
and press protections for academic speakers and writers. The three-judge panel
unanimously declared that an Illinois community college could not summarily dismiss an adjunct
teacher for writing a letter criticizing the administration, at least as long as the issues she had raised
publicly and visibly constituted “matters of public concern.”
The federal appeals court also noted that even a contingent or part-time teacher had a
reasonable expectation of continuing employment at the institution and therefore a protected
property interest. The appellate court ruled that Robin Meade, the outspoken critic and active
union officer, was “not alone in expressing concern about the treatment of adjuncts.” The panel
added that “colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage and
criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty.” In this regard, the court broke important
new ground not only with regard to academic freedom and professorial free expression, but even
more strikingly in its novel embrace of the needs and interests of adjuncts and part-timers.
On remand, the district court initially denied motions for summary judgment by both the
College and Meade. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ill. March 3, 2016). However, on October 17,
2016 in an unpublished decision the district court vacated this ruling, granted Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment, and denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Meade v. Moraine

10
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Valley Community College, No. 13 C 7950 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016). The court ruled in Meade’s
favor on both First Amendment and Due Process grounds, and explained.
In regard to the First Amendment retaliation claims, the Seventh Circuit made it
clear that the letter in question (Letter) involved a matter of public concern. The Seventh
Circuit indicated that this court need only address the remaining two issues of “whether the
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action, and whether the
defendant can show that it would have taken the same action without the existence of the
protected speech.” Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 770 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir.
2014). . . . . The undisputed facts in this case clearly show that the Letter was the motivating
factor behind the actions taken against Meade, and the College has not pointed to sufficient
evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the College would have taken the
same action without the existence of the protected speech. The College admits that it took
action against Meade because of her statements in the Letter. The College has not pointed
to other evidence showing that it had an alternative basis to terminate Meade’s
employment. . . .Therefore, Meade’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability
on the First Amendment retaliation claim is granted.
In regard to the due process claim, the Seventh Circuit has found that Meade has
shown that she has a protected property interest. Once again, after discovery and the filing
of dispositive motions, the undisputed facts show that Meade did not waive any right to
due process, and that she was not accorded a proper hearing. Meade justifiably declined to
appear at a prospective hearing that did not afford Meade an opportunity to obtain counsel.
The undisputed facts show that Meade was deprived of her protected interest and that the
deprivation was done is a way that violated due process standards. . . . Therefore, Meade’s
motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the due process claim is granted.
After this decision was issued Moraine settled with Professor Meade.
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015) and 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1100 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2016)
In this case, a U.S. District in Massachusetts ruled that speech made by a teacher as a union
representative was protected under the First Amendment finding that the Garcetti test did not apply
because speech was not a part of her normal employment duties as clarified in Lane v. Franks.
This case arose out of the September 2012 termination of the plaintiff, Jennifer Meagher
("Meagher"), from her employment as a tenured teacher at Andover High School ("AHS") in
Andover, Massachusetts. Prior to her termination, Meagher and other members of the teachers'
union, the Andover Education Association ("AEA" or "Union"), were involved in contentious
negotiations with the Andover School Committee over a new collective bargaining agreement. In
addition, AHS was engaged in the process of seeking re-accreditation pursuant to the standards
established by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges ("NEASC"). The
11
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accreditation process centered on a self-study, which required teachers and administrators at AHS
to conduct evaluations of the school's programs, prepare separate reports addressing one of seven
accreditation standards, and present the reports to the faculty for approval. Under the NEASC
guidelines, each report required approval by a two-thirds majority vote of the faculty. It was
undisputed that Meagher was discharged from employment, effective September 17, 2012,
because she sent an email to approximately sixty other teachers in which she urged them to enter
an "abstain" vote on the ballots for each of the self-study reports as a means of putting the
accreditation process on hold and using it to gain leverage in the collective bargaining negotiations.
Meagher alleged that the decision to terminate her for writing and distributing the email to her
colleagues constituted unlawful retaliation for, and otherwise interfered with, the exercise of her
First Amendment right to engage in free speech.
The fundamental issue was whether Meagher's email to her colleagues is entitled to
protection under the First Amendment. Pursuant to Garcetti v. Ceballos, her speech would be
protected if she were speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern rather than pursuant to
her duties as a teacher when she distributed the communication, and if the value of her speech was
not outweighed by the defendants' interest in preventing unnecessary disruptions to the efficient
operation of the Andover public schools.
In reviewing the facts, the court found that Meagher was speaking as a citizen.
The record on summary judgment establishes that Meagher was speaking as a citizen, and
not an employee of the Andover School Department, when she distributed the June 10,
2012 email at issue in this case. There is no dispute that Meagher wrote the email on her
personal, home computer, and distributed it to her colleagues using her personal email
account. Moreover, there is no dispute that she sent the communication during nonworking hours, that she contacted the recipients using their personal email accounts, and
that the email concerned issues that were addressed in the press and triggered considerable
discussion among members of the local com-munity. The substance of the email, in which
Meagher advocated use of the "abstain" option on the ballots for the self-study reports as a
means of delaying the NEASC re-accreditation process and gaining leverage in the contract
dispute between the Union and the ASC, would not have given objective observers the
impression that Meagher was representing her employer when she communicated with her
colleagues. . . . Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Meagher was working in her
capacity as a Union activist rather than in her capacity as a high school English teacher,
when she distributed the communication in question.
94. F Supp. 3d at 38.
The court also found that the value of Meagher's speech outweighed any interest that the
defendants had in preventing unnecessary disruptions and inefficiencies in the workplace.
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Therefore, the court found that Meagher’s speech was protected and that her termination violated
her rights under the First Amendment.
The suit and many of Meagher’s claims were ultimately adjudicated or resolved. While the
First Amendment lawsuit was pending the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board
("CERB" or "Board") issued its decision in connection with an unfair labor practices charge filed
by the union, finding Meagher's termination was in response to protected concerted activity
and that her employer had discriminated against her based on her union activity in violation of
Massachusetts law. The School Committee was ordered to reinstate Meagher to her teaching
position at AHS and to compensate Meagher for all losses she had suffered, if any, as a
result of the unlawful action. In addition, before the trial in the First Amendment lawsuit, the
parties settled Meagher's claim for $100,000.00, leaving to the court the issue of reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs, which it assessed at $183,691.97. Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1100 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2016)
D. Exclusive Representation
Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017) cert denied (Nov. 13, 2017); D'Agostino v.
Baker, 812 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 2016) cert denied (June 13, 2016); Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660
Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2016) cert denied (Feb. 27, 2017)
These cases involved lawsuits in which anti-union plaintiffs challenged the long
established rights of unions to exclusively represent employees in public sector bargaining. In a
decision written by former Supreme Court Justice David Souter, the First Circuit firmly rejected
the plaintiffs’ claims. The court explained, that non-union public employees have no cognizable
claim that their First Amendment associational rights were violated by the union acting as an
exclusive bargaining agent with the state. In D’Agostino v. Baker, 812 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 2016),
the court explained,
. . . that result is all the clearer under Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v.
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 79 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1984), which ruled against First
Amendment claims brought by public college faculty members, professional employees of
a state education system, who challenged a legislative mandate that a union selected as
their exclusive bargaining agent be also the exclusive agent to meet with officials on
educational policy beyond the scope of mandatory labor bargaining. The Court held that
neither a right to speak nor a right to associate was infringed, id. at 289; like the appellants
here, the academic employees in Knight could speak out publicly on any subject and were
free to associate themselves together outside the union however they might desire. Their
academic role was held to give them no variance from the general rules that there is no
right to compel state officials to listen to them, id. at 286, and no right to eliminate the

13

Published by The Keep, 2018

13

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 13 [2018], Art. 40

amplification that an exclusive agent necessarily enjoys in speaking for the unionized
majority, id. at 288.
The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s attempts to use the recent Supreme Court decision in
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014) to justify their claims. Plaintiffs sought review
by the Supreme Court, which was rejected on June 13, 2016. D'Agostino v. Baker, 195 L. Ed. 2d
812 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
Similarly, in Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. Ill. Mar. 9, 2017) the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation asserted that the state and public sector unions violated plaintiffs
First Amendment rights in enacting and enforcing legislation allowing home child-care providers
within a state-designated bargaining unit to elect an exclusive representative to bargain collectively
with the state. On March 9, 2017, the Seventh Second Circuit soundly rejected this argument,
explaining, “under Knight, the IPLRA's exclusive-bargaining-representative scheme is
constitutionally firm.” On November 13, 2017, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s writ of
certiorari. Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017).
E. Agency Fee
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31,
851 F. 3d 746 (7th Cir. March 21, 2017) cert granted 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4459 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 2017)
In this case, anti-union forces are making their second attempt to overrule the Supreme
Court’s 1977 precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which held that agency fees are
constitutional under the First Amendment. At issue in the case is whether nonmembers of unions,
who share in the wages, benefits, and protections that have been negotiated into a collectively
bargained contract, may be required to pay their fair share for the cost of those negotiations. The
National Right to Work Committee, which is behind the case, is asking the Court to find that such
fair share fees violate the First Amendment.
AAUP filed with the National Education Association (NEA) an amicus brief in the US
Supreme Court arguing that the payment of agency fees by nonmembers in public sector collective
bargaining unions is constitutional. The NEA/AAUP amicus brief explains that the US Supreme
Court’s historical interpretation of the First Amendment gives the government, in its role as
employer, significant authority to manage the public sector workplace. Where state laws provide
for public sector unionization, public employers have strong interests in ensuring robust collective
bargaining, including agency fees as a fair and equitable way to distribute the costs of collective
bargaining among all the employees who benefit. Evidence shows that maintaining a robust
collective bargaining system advances the government’s interest in providing high quality public
services. The amicus brief discusses studies showing that unionization in public schools and
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universities is linked to improving the quality of education and of working relationships within
educational institutions.
The Supreme Court held oral arguments in the case on February 26, 2018. Because none
of the justices appeared to depart from their expected position, the oral argument reinforced the
view that the Court will likely rule that the collection of agency fees in the public section is
unconstitutional. A decision is expected by the time the Court’s term ends in late June 2018. If the
Supreme Court holds that agency fees are unconstitutional, it would likely be effective the day it
is issued.
Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2016) cert denied (Feb. 27, 2017)
This case involved disputes regarding the refund of agency fees collected from non-union
members who were partial public employees under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v.
Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014). The plaintiffs were individuals operating home child care
businesses. They are covered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris which ruled that
collection of agency fees from these individuals violated to the First Amendment.
After the Harris decision was issued, the Union and the employer negotiated a new
collective bargaining agreement that did not require the deduction of agency fees. The union also
rebated to the plaintiff’s agency fees that were collected after the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Harris. The plaintiffs continued to prosecute their suit arguing that the Union was obligated to
rebate them for agency fees paid prior to the Court’s decision in Harris.
The second circuit found that the Union was not obligated to make such a reimbursement
as the union relied in good faith when it collected the agency fees prior to Harris. The Court
explained, “In obtaining the challenged fair share fees from plaintiffs, CSEA relied on a validly
enacted state law and the controlling weight of Supreme Court precedent. Because it was
objectively reasonable for CSEA "to act on the basis of a statute not yet held invalid," defendants
are not liable for damages stemming from the pre-Harris collection of fair share fees.” Jarvis v.
Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 72 *76, (2d Cir. N.Y. 2016). Similarly, the district court in Illinois
rejected a claim for payment of agency fees collected for services performed before the Harris
decision was issued on June 30, 2014. Winner v. Rauner, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175925 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 20, 2016).

III.

Academic Freedom and FOIA/Subpoenas
Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Arizona Board of Regents, Case No. 2CACV2017-0002 (Ariz. App. Ct., Second App. Div., Sept. 14, 2017) (unpublished)
In this decision the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected attempts by a “free market” legal
foundation to use public records requests to compel faculty members to release emails related to
their climate research. In an amicus brief in support of the scientists, the AAUP had argued that
15
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Arizona statute creates an exemption to public release of records for academic research records,
and that a general statutory exemption protecting records when in the best interests of the state, in
particular the state’s interest in academic freedom, should have been considered. The appeals court
agreed and reversed the decision of the trial court that required release of the records and returned
the case to the trial court so that it could address these issues.
This case has a long and tortured history, with two lower court decisions, two appeals court
decisions, and three AAUP amicus briefs. It started with a lawsuit filed by Energy & Environment
Legal Institute, a “free market” legal foundation using public records requests in a campaign
against climate science. Previously, E & E (then American Tradition Institute) sought similar
records of University of Virginia faculty members Michael Mann and others, which the Virginia
Supreme Court, with AAUP filing an amicus brief supporting the scientists, rebuffed. Here, E &
E’s public records requests targeted two University of Arizona faculty members, climate
researchers Professors Malcolm Hughes and Jonathan Overpeck. E & E counsel has stated that the
suit was intended to “put false science on trial” and E & E vowed to “keep peppering universities
around the country with similar requests under state open records laws.”
The case has moved between the trial court and the Appeals Court of Arizona several times.
In this appeal, the trial court had initially ruled that the records should be disclosed. As the Appeals
Court decision explained,
the trial court determined the e-mails sought by Energy & Environment Legal
Institute (E&E) that had been characterized as “prepublication critical analysis,
unpublished data, analysis, research, results, drafts, and commentary,” were subject
to release under A.R.S. § 39-121, concluding that Arizona Board of Regents
(Board) had “not met its burden justifying its decision to withhold the subject
emails.”
The University appealed, and AAUP submitted an amicus brief that advanced two
arguments. First, the trial court did not properly apply a section of the public records law which
specifically protected the research records of the university faculty, and thus created a privilege
for these records. Second, the trial court did not properly apply a general section of the public
records law which required that the court consider the best interests of the state, and particularly
the importance of academic freedom in research. As the brief explained, “Courts should consider
the best interests of the state to maintain a free and vital university system, which depends on the
protection of academic freedom to engage in the free and open scientific debate necessary to create
high quality academic research. Where the requests seek prepublication communications and other
unpublished academic research materials, as in the case at bar, compelled disclosure would have
a severe chilling effect on intellectual debate among researchers and scientists.”
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The Appeals Court agreed with both of these arguments, and reversed the decision of the
trial court. Importantly, the Appeals Court specifically found there was an academic privilege
created by the statute:
. . . . the trial court’s decision concludes that “the creation of an academic privilege
exception . . . is a proposition more properly made to the legislature rather than the
courts.” Section 15-1640, although it is not titled as an “academic privilege,” grants an
exemption from Arizona public records law for certain “records of a university.” The trial
court’s comment seems to demonstrate that the court did not consider the application of §
15-1640 and was not aware the legislature had already created an academic privilege.
The Appeals Court also found that, as argued by AAUP, the trial court had failed to address
whether the best interests of the state warranted protecting these research records. Because the trial
court had not properly applied the statutory protections available to the scientists, the Appeals
Court reversed the trial court’s decision requiring release of the records, and remanded the case to
the trial court for it to issue a decision fully addressing these protections.
Glass v. Paxton (University of Texas at Austin), appeal docketed, No. 17-50641 (5th Cir.
July 24, 2017)
This case involves an appeal of a lawsuit filed by several faculty at the University of Texas
contesting a policy that had been promulgated as a result of a Texas campus carry law. Texas
passed a “campus carry law” that expressly permits concealed handguns on university campuses,
and in 2016 the University of Texas at Austin issued a Campus Carry Policy mandating that faculty
permit concealed handguns in their classrooms. Several faculty filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that enforcement of the Campus Carry
Policy profoundly changes the educational environment in which Plaintiffs teach in violation of
the First Amendment. The District Court dismissed the case, holding that the faculty did not have
standing to sue because they had not proven that they had been harmed by the law or university
policy. The faculty appealed and the AAUP joined with the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun
Violence and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence in an amicus brief filed in the Fifth Circuit
in support of the faculty members’ appeal.
The brief explains that college campuses are marketplaces of ideas, and that the presence
of weapons has a chilling effect on rigorous academic exchange of ideas. The brief argues that the
policy (and the law pursuant to which the policy was created) requiring that handguns be permitted
in classrooms harms faculty as it deprives them of a core academic decision and chills their First
Amendment right to academic freedom.
The brief further explains that the deleterious impact of guns on education is widely
recognized by university administrators and faculty, whose conclusions are confirmed by a
significant body of social science research. The brief argues that the “decision whether to permit
17
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or exclude handguns in a given classroom is, at bottom, a decision about educational policy and
pedagogical strategy. It predictably affects not only the choice of course materials, but how a
particular professor can and should interact with her students—how far she should press a student
or a class to wrestle with unsettling ideas, how trenchantly and forthrightly she can evaluate student
work. Permitting handguns in the classroom also affects the extent to which faculty can or should
prompt students to challenge each other. The law and policy thus implicate concerns at the very
core of academic freedom: They compel faculty to alter their pedagogical choices, deprive them
of the decision to exclude guns from their classrooms, and censor their protected speech.”
McAdams v. Marquette University, pet. to bypass Ct. of Apps. granted, 379 Wis. 2d 438
(2018)
This pending appeal arose from a blog post written by Dr. McAdams, a tenured professor
at Marquette University, which criticized the university, other university faculty, and the actions
of a graduate student/instructor. The administration proposed terminating Dr. McAdams. The
Faculty Hearing Committee found that the opinions expressed by Dr. McAdams were protected
by academic freedom, but that parts of the blog post, such as naming the graduate
student/instructor, warranted a one to two-semester unpaid suspension, but not termination.
Marquette University President Michael Lovell accepted the recommendation of the suspension,
but also imposed a penalty, as a condition of Dr. Adams’s reinstatement, requiring Dr. McAdams
to write a statement of apology and admission of wrongdoing. Dr. McAdams’s reasonable refusal
to do so resulted in his de facto termination without due process or opportunity to contest the
administration’s action.
Dr. McAdams brought suit and claimed, inter alia, that Marquette violated his due process
rights and his right to academic freedom. The trial court granted Marquette’s motion for summary
judgment. Dr. McAdams appealed the trial court’s decision and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
agreed to bypass the Court of Appeals and to hear the case immediately. The AAUP recently filed
an amicus brief in the Wisconsin Supreme Court in support of Dr. John McAdams, who seeks to
overturn the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for summary judgment. The AAUP amicus
brief explained that its policy documents and standards guaranteeing faculty rights of academic
freedom and due process must protect faculty (like Dr. McAdams) from discipline when they
express controversial views.
On the academic freedom issue, the trial court opined, “In short, academic freedom gives
a professor, such as Dr. McAdams, the right to express his view in speeches, writing and on the
internet, so long as he does not infringe on the rights of others.” The amicus brief explained that
“Such a formulation of limiting academic freedom to ‘views’ that do ‘not infringe on the rights of
others’ vastly undermines academic freedom. The nature of offering opinions, particularly
controversial ones, is that they may prompt vigorous responses, including assertions that the right
of others have been infringed. Views and opinions should be subject to debate, not to limitations
based on claims that the expression of views infringes upon the rights of others. Adding such a
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component will only serve to limit the openness and breadth of the views expressed in academia,
compromising essential rights of academic freedom.” The amicus brief urged the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to adopt AAUP standards to interpret academic freedom policies, including those
at Marquette, as protecting faculty from discipline for extramural speech unless the university
administration proves that such speech clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness to
serve, taking into account his entire record as a teacher and scholar. As AAUP standards explain,
“Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s fitness for continuing service.”
The amicus brief also argued that Marquette violated Dr. McAdams’s due process rights
by unilaterally imposing a new penalty that required Dr. McAdams to write a statement of
apology/admission as a condition of reinstatement. This severe sanction would compel Dr.
McAdams to renounce his opinions, a fundamental violation of his academic freedom. It also
amounted to a de facto termination that was imposed in contravention of the Faculty Hearing
Committee’s recommended lesser penalty.
City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump et. al., No. 3:2017cv00485-WHO
(N.D. Cal. 2017), County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, et. al., No. 3:2017cv00574WHO (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-17478 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017)
This pending appeal involves a challenge to a January 25, 2017 Trump administration
Executive Order 13768 “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” which
declared that “(i)t is the policy of the executive branch to . . . (e)nsure that jurisdictions that fail to
comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.”
Section 9 implements that policy by commanding executive branch officials to strip state and local
governments deemed to be “sanctuary jurisdictions” of their eligibility “to receive grants.” The
City and County of San Francisco filed suit in the US District Court for the Northern District of
California against President Trump and other federal officials, alleging that the Executive Order
violated the separation of powers doctrine, the Tenth Amendment, and due process guarantees. On
April 25, 2017, the District Court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against the
Executive Order determining that the City and County of San Francisco and County of Santa Clara
had pre-enforcement standing to protect hundreds of millions of dollars of federal grants from the
unconstitutionally broad sweep of the Executive Order. The AAUP joined an amicus brief
submitted to the Ninth Circuit in support of the permanent injunction that enjoins the US
government from enforcing Section 9 (a) of Executive Order 13768. The amicus brief argued that
upholding the Executive Order would create a precedent that would enable the Trump
administration to extend the Executive Order to apply to colleges and universities, and addresses
the harms that would flow from overturning the permanent injunction.
The amicus brief further argued that such an extension would negatively impact colleges’
and universities’ ability to carry out their public mission (“This public mission extends to private
and nonprofit colleges and universities as well. In the United States, colleges and universities
explicitly see themselves as “conducted for the common good.” AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV.
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PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure), and their
interests in developing a diverse student body, “ . . . A diverse student body breaks down
stereotypes, “promotes learning outcomes,” and “‘better prepares students for an increasingly
diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at
330. (quoting from amicus brief); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210. Diversity contributes to a robust
exchange of ideas, exposure to different cultures and the acquisition of competencies necessary in
our increasingly diverse society and closely connected world. Id. at 2211.” The brief also
emphasized the harms caused by the Executive Order—undermining the critical interest that our
society has in the education of all its residents regardless of immigration status; threatening higher
education’s constitutional interest in educational independence to create the sort of diverse student
body that is critical to the intellectual and academic life of the community; devastating university
research opportunities by withdrawing federal funding for failure to participate in federal
immigration enforcement; and penalizing students’ opportunities for higher education by
withdrawing federal student scholarship funding.

IV.

Tenure, Due Process, Breach of Contract, and Pay
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract
Matter of Monaco v. N.Y. Univ., 145 A.D.3d 567, 43 N.Y.S.3d 328 (N.Y. App. Div.,
2016)
Professors Marie Monaco and Herbert Samuels, New York University Medical School,
had their salaries significantly slashed after NYU arbitrarily imposed a salary reduction policy.
The Professors believed that this policy violated their contracts of employment, as well as NYU’s
handbook which, in its definition of tenure, “guarantees both freedom of research and economic
security and thus prohibits a diminution in salary.” NYU argued that it was not even bound by the
Faculty Handbook. On December 15, 2016, the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Appellate Division, First Department found that Professors Monaco and Samuels sufficiently
alleged that the policies contained in NYU’s handbook, which, “form part of the essential
employment understandings between a member of the Faculty and the University have the force
of contract.”
Beckwith v. Pa. State Univ., 672 F. App’x 194 (3d Cir. 2016)
Plaintiff, a tenure track faculty, brought suit against the university and alleged that the
university breached her employment agreement when the university terminated her before the end
of her employment agreement. Plaintiff’s offer letter described her position as “tenure-eligible”
with tenure being a six-year process although consideration for earlier tenure was possible based
on performance yet was also subject to the universities’ policies regarding faculty appointments.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to overcome
Pennsylvania’s presumption of at-will employment because she failed to show that there was “an
express contract between the parties for a definite duration or an explicit statement that an
employee can only be terminated “for cause.’” The court emphasized that because Plaintiff’s
employment agreement (nor any other document that was incorporated by reference) failed to
establish a term of years, Plaintiff did not meet her burden on the breach of contract claim.
B. Tenure – Constitutionality
Vergara v. State of Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 619, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist., May 3, 2016)
In this case, the Court of Appeal of California issued a decision overturning a ruling by a
California state court judge that found that California statutes providing tenure protections to K–
12 teachers violated the equal protection provisions of the California constitution. The case arose
from a challenge, funded by anti-union organizations, to five California statutes that provide
primary and secondary school teachers a two-year probationary period, stipulate procedural
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination, and emphasize teacher seniority in
reductions of force. The AAUP submitted an amicus brief which argued that the challenged
statutes help protect teachers from retaliation, help keep good teachers in the classroom by
promoting teacher longevity and discouraging teacher turnover, and allow teachers to act in
students’ interests in presenting curricular material and advocating for students within the school
system. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the statutes
themselves did not create equal protection violations, so they are not unconstitutional.
The challenged statutes in the California Education Code establish: a two-year
probationary period during which new teachers may be terminated without cause, due process
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination for cause, and procedures for
implementing budget-based reductions-in-force. After an eight-week bench trial, Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Rolf Michael Treu, in a short sixteen-page opinion containing only
superficial analysis, adopted the plaintiffs’ theories in full, striking down each challenged statute
as unconstitutional. In doing so, Judge Treu improperly used the “strict scrutiny” standard and
failed to adequately consider the substantial state interest in providing statutory rights of tenure
and due process for K–12 teachers in the public schools.
The AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of tenure. The AAUP has a particular interest
in defending the due process protections of tenure at all levels of education. The brief, primarily
authored by Professor Charlotte Garden, an expert in labor law and constitutional law and litigation
director of the Korematsu Center for Law & Equality at Seattle University, advanced two
substantive arguments. First, the brief explained that by helping to insulate teachers from backlash
or retaliation, the challenged statutes allow teachers to act in students’ interests in deciding when
and how to present curricular material and to advocate for students within their schools and
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districts. In so doing, the brief recognized the distinction between the academic freedom rights of
primary and secondary school teachers and those of professors in colleges and universities.
Second, the brief argued that students are better off when good teachers remain in their classrooms,
and the challenged statutes promote teacher longevity and discourage teacher turnover.
A three judge panel in the Court of Appeal reversed the earlier judgment, finding that the
tenure, dismissal, and layoff statutes themselves did not cause equal protection violations, so they
are not unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the negative evidence related to inexperienced
teachers and poor and minority students was the result of external factors such as administrative
decisions, and were not directly caused by the text of the statutes. In other words, the problems
were caused by how people are implementing the statutes, not by the system the statutes create.
Additionally, the court decided the evidence showing that ineffective teachers can adversely affect
students did not demonstrate that the tenure, dismissal, and layoff system itself creates this problem
or leads to an unfair distribution of ineffective teachers.
C. Due Process
Wilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex., 878 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2017)
Plaintiff, a non-tenured professor, had a one-year appointment per a contract that included
a five-year commitment to renew at the option of the university. Plaintiff was informed by a
university representative that the renewal provision was only included for the university’s
convenience and would only be invoked if there was a reduction in workforce that necessitated
non-renewals. Plaintiff was terminated and alleged that he had a property interest in his continued
employment. The question before the court was not whether the university was within its right to
terminate Plaintiff but rather was Plaintiff reasonable in expecting, based on rules and
expectations, the university to employ him for the fourth year of a five-year contract? The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas followed the reasoning in Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972), and held that Plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of his continued employment based on the university’s assurances and the
context of his contract that it would exercise its option to renew each year, absent serious violations
or a reduction in force.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and
found that the Sindermann case was not dispositive here, “. . . Sindermann noted that Texas law
could still bar a teacher’s due process claim.” “Far from inviting Wilkerson ‘to feel that he has
permanent tenure’”, citation omitted, his contract provided a one-year appointment, and the bylaws
and caselaw warned not to expect further ones. . .” The court further noted that the district court
overlooked the contract’s integration clause and put “informal understandings and customs” above
the university’s officially promulgated position.
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McAdams v. Marquette University, pet. to bypass Ct. of Apps. granted, 379 Wis. 2d 438
(2018)
This pending appeal arose from a blog post written by Dr. McAdams, which criticized the
university, other university faculty, and the actions of a graduate student/instructor. The
administration proposed terminating Dr. McAdams. The Faculty Hearing Committee found that
the opinions expressed by Dr. McAdams were protected by academic freedom, but that parts of
the blog post, such as naming the graduate student/instructor, warranted a one to two-semester
unpaid suspension, but not termination. Marquette University President Michael Lovell accepted
the recommendation of the suspension, but also imposed a penalty, as a condition of Dr. Adams’s
reinstatement, requiring Dr. McAdams to write a statement of apology and admission of
wrongdoing. Dr. McAdams’s reasonable refusal to do so resulted in his de facto termination
without due process or opportunity to contest the administration’s action. Dr. McAdams brought
suit and claimed, inter alia, that Marquette violated his due process rights and his right to academic
freedom. The trial court granted Marquette’s motion for summary judgment. Dr. McAdams
appealed the trial court’s decision and the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to bypass the Court
of Appeals and to hear the case immediately.
The amicus brief argue that Marquette violated Dr. McAdams’s due process rights by
unilaterally imposing a new penalty that required Dr. McAdams to write a statement of
apology/admission as a condition of reinstatement. This severe sanction would compel Dr.
McAdams to renounce his opinions, a fundamental violation of his academic freedom. It also
amounted to a de facto termination that was imposed in contravention of the Faculty Hearing
Committee’s recommended lesser penalty.
D. Faculty Handbooks
Crosby v. University of Kentucky 863 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. July 17, 2017)
In this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard Crosby, is a tenured Professor and former Department Chair at the
University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health. He filed suit against the University and several
University officials under Section 1983 and state law, claiming that his removal as Department
Chair amounted to a violations of his right to due process. Prior to his removal, the University had
investigated Plaintiff-Appellant for reports that he was “[v]olatile,” “explosive,” “disrespectful,”
“condescending,” “out of control,” “prone to angry outbursts,” made an offensive remark about
women, and that the Department’s performance was suffering because of Plaintiff-Appellant’s
temper and hostility toward other departments. After being stripped of his Department Chair
position, Plaintiff-Appellant appealed and demanded that the University handle his appeal under a
proposed governing regulation not yet adopted by the University. The University declined, and
Plaintiff-Appellant filed suit. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Sixth Circuit found
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that Plaintiff-Appellant identified “no statute, formal contract, or contract implied from the
circumstances that supports his claim to a protected property interest in his position as Chair,” and
that the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

V.

Discrimination and Affirmative Action
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016)
The US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of University of Texas at Austin’s
affirmative action program. In its second consideration of Fisher’s challenge to UT’s program, the
Court confirmed that universities must prove that race is considered only as necessary to meet the
permissible goals of affirmative action. In particular, the university must prove that “race-neutral
alternatives” will not suffice to meet these goals.
In the first Fisher appeal, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 7 to 1, followed longstanding
precedent and recognized that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in ensuring
student body diversity, and can take account of an individual applicant’s race as one of several
factors in their admissions program as long as the program is narrowly tailored to achieve that
compelling interest. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)(Fisher I). The
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the court below had not properly applied the “strict scrutiny”
standard and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit. In November 2013, the AAUP again
signed onto ACE’s amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit, which reiterated the arguments enumerated
above. In July 2014, for the second time, the Fifth Circuit upheld the UT Austin admissions
plan. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). Fisher petitioned to have the
Supreme Court review the case (again) and that request was granted on June 29, 2015 the AAUP
joined the amicus brief in Fisher II, authored by ACE and joined by thirty-seven other higher
education organizations.
In 2016, the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the UT Austin’s affirmative
action program in Fisher II. Due to Justice Kagan’s recusal from the case and with the death of
Justice Scalia, only seven justices took part, resulting in a 4-3 decision. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the Court is significant in taking a realistic and reasonable approach that should enable
universities to adopt affirmative action programs that meet constitutional requirements.
The Court applied the three key criteria from its earlier decision in this case (Fisher I): (1)
a university must show that it has a substantial purpose or interest in considering race as a factor
in its admissions policy and that considering race is necessary to achieve this purpose; (2) courts
should defer, though not completely, to a university’s academic judgment that there are educational
benefits that flow from diversity in the student body; and (3) the university must prove that raceneutral alternatives will not achieve its goals of increasing diversity.
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The Court’s decision recognizes that judges should give due deference to universities in
defining educational goals that include the benefits of increasing diversity in the student body,
such as the promotion of cross-racial understanding and the preparation of students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society.
The Court confirmed that universities must prove that race is considered only as necessary
to meet the permissible goals of affirmative action. In particular, the university must prove that
“race-neutral alternatives” will not suffice to meet these goals. This was the most controversial
aspect of the Fisher I decision. In Fisher II, though, the Court takes a reasonable approach, finding
that UT had sufficient evidence that its “Top Ten” admissions policy based on class rank was not
adequate, by itself, to meet diversity goals. By adding a “holistic” evaluation of applicants who
were not admitted in the “Top Ten” program, UT was able to consider race as one factor in a
broader assessment of qualifications.
The Court noted that the “prospective guidance” of its decision is limited to some extent
by the particularities of the UT case. Despite this, the Court’s decision does provide important
guidance to universities concerning the criteria that will be applied in evaluating affirmative action
programs. The Court also emphasizes that universities have “a continuing obligation” to “engage
[] in periodic reassessment of the constitutionality, and efficacy, of [their] admissions program[s].”
While this requires ongoing study and evaluation by universities, the Court’s decision creates a
significant and positive basis for universities to adopt affirmative action programs that meet
constitutional requirements.
B. Sexual Misconduct – Title IX
Letter from Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education, (Sept. 22, 2017)
In a Dear Colleague Letter issued on September 22, 2017 the Department of Education
announced its withdrawal of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and the related 2014 "Q&A"
guidance. The Department also issued a Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct and announced it
intends to conduct a notice and comment rulemaking process. The 2017 letter and Q&A’s largely
revert to the guidance that predated the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, though they offer certain
specific advice that extends beyond the earlier guidance. (See companion paper by Bridget
Maricich for further details.)
Article: Aaron Nisenson, Constitutional Due Process and Title IX Investigation and
Appeal Procedures at Colleges and Universities, 120 Penn State Law Review 963 (Spring
2016)
Over the last several years, the federal government has been pressing universities and
colleges to strengthen the processes used for the investigation, discipline, and appeal of sexual
harassment and assault cases arising under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments. Public
sector universities and colleges are also obligated to provide to employees and students disciplined
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for sexual harassment or assault procedural protections under the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. These disparate legal obligations have led to lawsuits alleging that universities have
failed to comply with the Due Process Clause when discipline has been instituted as a result of
Title IX investigations or when instituting discipline. This article provides an overview of
Constitutional Due Process rights and their application to public sector universities and colleges
and will review recent judicial decisions addressing these rights in cases arising from
investigations, discipline and appeals under Title IX. It also includes recommendations for
balancing need to address sexual misconduct on campus with the due process rights of students
and employees.

VI.

Immigration
A. Executive Order Banning Immigration
Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10356 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017) cert granted
2018 U.S. LEXIS 759 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2018)
This pending Supreme Court appeal arose from a Ninth Circuit decision and order
affirming in part and vacating in part the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting the
government from enforcing one of the President's Executive Orders on immigration. In March
2017, the President issued Executive Order No. 13,769, which temporarily restricted foreign
nationals of certain countries and refugees from entering into the United States. Plaintiffs brought
suit challenging the legality of the Order. On motion by Plaintiffs, a district court preliminarily
enjoined the federal government from enforcing Sections 2 and 6 of the Order. Defendants
appealed, and the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the district court's ruling. The Ninth Circuit found
that the President exceeded his authority in issuing an order excluding nationals of specified
countries from entry into the United States since there were no adequate findings that entry of
excluded nationals would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, that present vetting
standards were inadequate, or that absent improved vetting procedures there likely would be harm
to the national interests. It also held that the order improperly suspended entry of the nationals on
the basis of their country of origin, since the order in substance operated as a prohibited
discriminatory ban on visa issuance on the basis of nationality. Finally it ruled that restricting entry
of refugees and decreasing the annual number of refugees who could be admitted was improper
since there was no showing that the entry of refugees was harmful and procedures for setting the
annual admission of refugees were disregarded.
The Trump administration appealed the case to the US Supreme Court, which recently
agreed to hear the case. The Trump administration argues that by preventing the President from
implementing the travel ban, the courts have restricted the President’s ability to protect the nation,
pointing to the possibility of inadequate information-sharing and deficient risk assessments from
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foreign nations. Hawaii responded by emphasizing that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was not
restrictive, but rather iterated the previously imposed limitations on the President’s authority.
The Supreme Court will consider four questions raised in Trump v. Hawaii, 199 L.Ed.2d
620 (U.S. 2018): Can the courts even review this challenge? Has the President overstepped his
authority over immigration in issuing the September 24 order? Was the lower court’s ruling
overbroad? Does the September 24 order violate the Establishment Clause? The Supreme Court
will hear oral argument on April 25, 2018, with a decision expected to be released in late June.
The AAUP is again considering signing onto an amicus brief authored by the American Council
on Education contesting the Executive Order based on the arguments advanced in the first case.
Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (June 26, 2017)(granting
cert and granting stay in part), 138 S. Ct. 353 (Oct. 10, 2017)(vacating judgement as
moot)
The Supreme Court case arose out of appeals from two lower court decisions addressing
the travel ban, Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017) and Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. May 25, 2017). In Hawaii v. Trump, plaintiffs
brought suit challenging the legality of the travel ban. The federal district court preliminarily
enjoined the federal government from enforcing certain sections of the travel ban. The government
appealed, and the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the district court's
ruling. The Ninth Circuit found that the President exceeded his authority in issuing an order
excluding nationals of specified countries from entry into the United States since there were no
adequate findings that entry of excluded nationals would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States, that present vetting standards were inadequate, or that absent improved vetting
procedures there likely would be harm to the national interests. It also held that the travel ban
improperly suspended entry of the nationals on the basis of their country of origin, since the travel
ban in substance operated as a prohibited discriminatory ban on visa issuance on the basis of
nationality. Finally, it ruled that restricting entry of refugees and decreasing the annual number of
refugees who could be admitted was improper since there was no showing that the entry of refugees
was harmful and procedures for setting the annual admission of refugees were disregarded.
In Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, after the district court concluded that
Plaintiffs had standing to sue, it found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their
Establishment Clause claim and issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the travel
ban. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the political
branches' plenary power over immigration is subject to constitutional limitations and that, "Where
plaintiffs have seriously called into question whether the stated reason for the challenged action
was provided in good faith," courts are required to look beyond that stated, facially legitimate
rationale for evidence the rationale is not genuine. In this case, the court examined the travel ban
in the context of statements made by the president during the 2016 campaign season and found
that it "drip[ped] with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination." The court held that the
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preliminary injunction was proper because it could likely be shown that the Muslim travel ban
violated the Establishment Clause because its primary purpose was religious, based on evidence
that it was motivated by the President's desire to exclude Muslims from the United States. The
court also rejected the government’s reliance on allegations of harm to national security interests
finding they did not outweigh the competing harm of the likely constitutional violation and because
it was plausibly alleged that the stated national security purpose was provided in bad faith.
The Supreme Court of the United States consolidated these cases and on June 26, 2017,
the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for writ of certiorari and issued a brief
opinion allowing the government to enforce the Muslim travel ban, with an exception for travelers
and refugees who have a “credible claim” of a genuine relationship with an individual or institution
in the United States. When that relationship is with an institution, the relationship must be a
genuine one, rather than one created just to get around the Muslim travel ban.
On September 18, 2017, the AAUP joined with the American Council on Education and
other higher education associations, in an amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court that opposes the
travel ban. The brief specifically noted the harm to faculty: “From the moment [travel ban] was
signed, . . . [f]aculty recruits were . . . deterred from accepting teaching and research positions.
And scholars based abroad pulled out of academic conferences in the United States, either because
they were directly affected by the [travel ban] or because they are concerned about the [travel
ban’s] harmful impact on academic discourse and research worldwide.” It is difficult to overstate
the importance of conferences, colloquia, and symposia to scholarly communication. They enable
intellectual give-and take and real-time digestion and discussion of research. Conferences also
allow for in-person encounters and discussions that give rise to important future collaborations.”
The brief concluded “American colleges and universities ‘have a mission of ‘global
engagement’ and rely on . . . visiting students, scholars, and faculty to advance their educational
goals.’ Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9Th Cir. 2017). That vital mission cannot be
achieved if American immigration policy no longer sends a welcoming message to the members
of the international community who wish to enter our campus gates. As explained above, the
[travel ban] jeopardizes the many contributions that foreign students, scholars, and researchers
make to American colleges and universities, as well as our nation’s economy and general wellbeing.”
The travel ban expired by its own terms in late 2017. Therefore, on October 10, 2017, the
Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case with instructions to
dismiss the case as moot due to the September 24, 2017 expiration of certain parts of the travel
ban. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (Oct. 10, 2017)(vacating judgement
as moot). On October 24, 2017, vacated the judgement of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case
with instructions to dismiss the case as moot due to the October 24, 2017 expiration of another
provision of the travel ban. Trump v. Hawaii, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6367, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275, (Oct. 24
2017)(vacating judgement as moot.)
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VII.

Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Private Sector
A. NLRB Authority
1. Religiously Affiliated Institutions
Pacific Lutheran Univ. & SEIU, Local 925, 361 N.L.R.B. 157 (2014)
In this case the National Labor Relations Board published a significant decision expanding
the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. The Board modified the standards used to
determine two important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher
education institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain
institutions and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious
activities; and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from
protection of the Act. (see infra) However, both holdings may be overturned by a newly constituted
Board.
In its decision the NLRB ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioned for faculty
members, even though they were employed at a religious institution. The question of whether
faculty members in religious institutions are subject to jurisdiction and coverage of the Act has
long been a significant issue, with the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Catholic Bishops serving
as the foundation for any analysis. In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board established a twopart test for determining jurisdiction. First, whether “as a threshold matter, [the university] holds
itself out as providing a religious educational environment”; and if so, then, second, whether “it
holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating or
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”
The employer and its supporters argued that only the threshold question of whether the
university was a bona fide religious institution was relevant, in which case the Act would not apply
to any faculty members. The Board responded that this argument “overreaches because it focuses
solely on the nature of the institution, without considering whether the petitioned-for faculty
members act in support of the school’s religious mission.” Therefore, the Board established a
standard that examines whether faculty members play a role in supporting the school’s religious
environment.
In so doing, the Board recognized concerns that inquiry into faculty members’ individual
duties in religious institutions may involve examining the institution’s religious beliefs, which
could intrude on the institution’s First Amendment rights. To avoid this issue the new standard
focuses on what the institution “holds out” with respect to faculty members. The Board explained,
“We shall decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications
to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.”
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The Board also found that that faculty must be “held out as performing a specific religious
function,” such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework or engaging in
religious indoctrination (emphasis in original). This would not be satisfied by general statements
that faculty are to support religious goals, or that they must adhere to an institution’s commitment
to diversity or academic freedom. Applying this standard, the Board found that while Pacific
Lutheran University held itself out as providing a religious educational environment, the
petitioned-for faculty members were not performing a specific religious function. Therefore, the
Board asserted jurisdiction and turned to the question of whether certain of the faculty members
were managerial employees.
However, this holding is very susceptible to reversal by a newly constituted Board, and the
holding drew dissents from both Republican members of the Board. The NLRB would not be able
to modify PLU until one or more cases with these issues come to the Board on appeal. In recent
unfair labor practice cases, the Board rejected attempts by several religiously affiliated universities
to overturn earlier election decisions where the Board asserted jurisdiction. See Xavier University,
Case 3–CA–204564 (NLRB March 9, 2018). However, these were generally procedural rulings
that do not portend the Board affirming the Pacific Lutheran standard substantively. One of these
cases involving Duquesne University was recently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court may address the standard there. Duquesne v.
NLRB, appeal docketed, No.18-1063 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 2018).
2. Faculty as Managers
Pacific Lutheran Univ. & SEIU, Local 925, 361 N.L.R.B. 157 (2014)
In this case the National Labor Relations Board published a significant decision expanding
the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. The Board modified the standards used to
determine two important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher
education institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain
institutions and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious
activities (see supra); and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are
excluded from protection of the Act. In addressing this second issue, the Board specifically
highlighted, as AAUP had in its amicus brief submitted in the case, the increasing corporatization
of the university. However, this holding is susceptible to reversal under a newly constituted Board.
This case started when faculty members at Pacific Lutheran University petitioned for an
election to be represented by a union. The university challenged the decision to hold the election,
claiming that some or all of the faculty members were managers and therefore ineligible for union
representation. The NLRB Regional Director ruled in favor of the union and found that the faculty
in question do not have enough managerial authority to be precluded from unionizing. Pacific
Lutheran asked the NLRB to overturn this ruling. The NLRB invited briefs from interested parties
on the questions regarding whether university faculty members seeking to be represented by a
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union are employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act or excluded as managers and
whether the NLRB has jurisdiction over faculty members at religious educational institutions.
In March 2014, the AAUP submitted an amicus brief urging the NLRB to consider the full
context when determining whether faculty at private colleges are managerial. The brief described
the significant changes in university hierarchical and decision-making models since the US
Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and
thus ineligible to unionize. The AAUP brief urged the NLRB to consider, when determining the
managerial status of faculty, factors such as the extent of university administration hierarchy, the
extent to which the administration makes academic decisions based on market-based
considerations, the degree of consultation by the administration with faculty governance bodies,
whether the administration treats faculty recommendations as advisory rather than as effective
recommendations, whether the administration routinely approves nearly all faculty
recommendations without independent administrative review, and whether conflict between the
administration and the faculty reflects a lack of alignment of administration and faculty interests.
In its decision the NLRB ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioned for faculty
members, even though they were employed at a religious institution, and that the faculty members
were not managers. This second question arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva,
where the Court found that in certain circumstances faculty may be considered “managers” who
are excluded from the protections of the Act. The Board noted that the application
of Yeshiva previously involved an open-ended and uncertain set of criteria for making decisions
regarding whether faculty were managers. This led to significant complications in determining
whether the test was met and created uncertainty for all of the parties.
Further, in explaining the need for the new standard, the Board specifically highlighted, as
AAUP had in its amicus brief, the increasing corporatization of the university. The Board stated,
“Indeed our experience applying Yeshiva has generally shown that colleges and universities are
increasingly run by administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and centering authority
away from the faculty in a way that was contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva
University itself. Such considerations are relevant to our assessment of whether the faculty
constitute managerial employees.”
In Pacific Lutheran, the Board sought to create a simpler framework for determining
whether faculty members served as managers. The Board explained that under the new standard,
“where a party asserts that university faculty are managerial employees, we will examine the
faculty’s participation in the following areas of decision making: academic programs, enrollment
management, finances, academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions.” The Board will
give greater weight to the first three areas, as these are “areas of policy making that affect the
university as whole.” The Board “will then determine, in the context of the university’s decision
making structure and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship with the university,
whether the faculty actually control or make effective recommendation over those areas. If they
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do, we will find that they are managerial employees and, therefore, excluded from the Act’s
protections.”
The Board emphasized that to be found managers, faculty must in fact have actual control
or make effective recommendations over policy areas. This requires that “the party asserting
managerial status must prove actual—rather than mere paper—authority. . . . A faculty handbook
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area,
but it must be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority in fact.” Proof requires
“specific evidence or testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty decisions or
recommendations in a particular decision making area, and the subsequent review of those
decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation,
rather than mere conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations are generally followed.”
Further, the Board used strong language in defining “effective” as meaning that “recommendations
must almost always be followed by the administration” or “routinely become operative without
independent review by the administration.”
University of Southern California v. National Labor Relations Board, appeal docketed,
No. 17-1149 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
This case arose when SEIU filed a petition to represent non-tenure-track full-time and parttime faculty in two colleges within USC. USC objected to the petition arguing that the faculty were
managers under Yeshiva. The Board applied the test established in Pacific Lutheran
University, 361 NLRB 1404 (2014) (in which AAUP had also filed an amicus brief) and found
that the faculty in the units were not managerial and therefore were eligible to unionize. After the
union won the election in the Roski School of Art and Design, USC refused to bargain citing its
objection, and the Board ordered USC to bargain. USC appealed to the US Court of Appeals for
the DC Circuit arguing that the faculty had no right to unionize as they were managerial
employees.
The AAUP submitted an amicus brief December 28, 2017 to the US Court of Appeals for
the DC Circuit urging the Court to uphold the NLRB’s determination that non-tenure-track faculty
at USC are not managerial employees. The brief supported the legal framework established by the
NLRB in Pacific Lutheran University and describes in detail the significant changes in university
hierarchical and decision-making models since the US Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that faculty
at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and thus ineligible to unionize under the
National Labor Relations Act. Specifically, the Board concluded that USC had not proven that
non-tenure-track faculty actually exercise control or make effective recommendations about
policies that affect the university as a whole. The brief focused on the fundamental structural and
operational changes in universities during the more than three decades since NLRB v. Yeshiva
University. Universities have adopted a corporate model of decision-making and employment
relations that has reduced faculty authority in university policy-making and has created conflicts
of interests between faculty and university administrations. Rather than relying on faculty expertise
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and recommendations, the growing ranks of university administrators have engaged increasingly
in unilateral top-down decision-making, often influenced by considerations of external market
forces and revenue generation. At the same time, universities have cut back on tenure-track/tenured
positions and greatly expanded non-tenure-track faculty positions. Under these conditions,
universities’ assertions that faculty are managerial are often based only on “paper authority” rather
than actual authority or effective recommendations by faculty in university policy-making.
3. Graduate Assistants Right to Organize
Columbia University, 364 N.L.R.B. 90 (2016)
Echoing arguments made by the AAUP in an amicus brief, the National Labor Relations
Board held that student assistants working at private colleges and universities are statutory
employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act. The 3–1 decision overrules a 2004
decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not employees and
therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize. However, this decision is susceptible to reversal
under a newly constituted Board.
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Board arguing that extending collective
bargaining rights to student employees promotes academic freedom and does not harm facultystudent mentoring relationships, and instead would reflect the reality that the student employees
were performing the work of the university when fulfilling their duties. In reversing Brown, the
majority said that the earlier decision “deprived an entire category of workers of the protections of
the Act without a convincing justification.” The Board found that granting collective bargaining
rights to student employees would not infringe on First Amendment academic freedom and, citing
the AAUP amicus brief, would not seriously harm the ability of universities to function. The Board
also relied on the AAUP amicus brief when it found that the duties of graduate assistant constituted
work for the university and were not primarily educational.
The AAUP decided to file an amicus brief in this case in keeping with its long history of
support for the unionization of graduate assistants. The AAUP has previously filed numerous
amicus briefs arguing the graduate assistants are employees with rights to unionize under the
NLRA, has issued statements affirming the rights of graduate assistants to unionize, and has an
active committee on graduate students and professional employees that represents the interests of
graduate students. The AAUP brief in this case addressed the two questions involving the Brown
decision. The brief argued that graduate assistants, including those working on federal grant funded
research, are employees with the right to unionize under the NLRA and it refuted the Brown
decision’s speculative claims that collective bargaining would compromise academic freedom and
the cooperative relationships between faculty mentors and their graduate student mentees.
In its decision, the Board held that graduate assistants, and other student teaching and
research assistants, are employees with a right to unionize. In doing so the Board echoed arguments
made by the AAUP and specifically cited the AAUP amicus brief. First the Board found, as AAUP
had argued, that the unionization of graduate students would not infringe upon First Amendment
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academic freedom. The Board explained that “there is little, if any, basis here to conclude that
treating employed graduate students as employees under the Act would raise serious constitutional
questions, much less violate the First Amendment.” Id. at 7.
The Board next found that experience with graduate student unions, primarily in the public
sector, had demonstrated that unionization did not seriously harm the ability of universities to
function. The Board stated, “As AAUP notes in its amicus brief, many of its unionized faculty
chapters’ collective-bargaining agreements expressly refer to and quote the AAUP’s 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which provides a framework that has
proven mutually agreeable to many unions and universities.”Id. at 10, footnote 82. Therefore, the
Board found that “there is no compelling reason—in theory or in practice—to conclude that
collective bargaining by student assistants cannot be viable or that it would seriously interfere with
higher education.” Id. at 12.
Finally, the Board also found that the duties of teaching assistants constituted work for the
institutions. The Board noted that “teaching assistants frequently take on a role akin to that of
faculty, the traditional purveyors of a university’s instructional output.” In doing so, the Board
again cited to the AAUP’s amicus brief. “As the American Association of University Professors,
an organization that represents professional faculty—the very careers that many graduate students
aspire to—states in its brief, teaching abilities acquired through teaching assistantships are of
relatively slight benefit in the attainment of a career in higher education.” Id. at 16, footnote 104.
Despite the instability that this would add to the NLRB’s precedents, a newly constituted
NLRB could overrule Columbia University and return to the Brown University holding that
graduate assistants are not employees under the NLRA. In Columbia, Miscimarra filed a vigorous
dissent arguing that the Board’s earlier decision and reasoning in Brown were correct. Id. at 2425. Miscimarra explained his broader disagreement with the Board’s decision.
I disagree with my colleagues' decision to apply the Act to college and university
student assistants. In my view, this change is unsupported by our statute, and it is illadvised based on substantial considerations, including those that far outweigh whether
students can engage in collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of educationrelated positions while attempting to earn an undergraduate or graduate [*112] degree.
The Supreme Court has stated that "the authority structure of a university does not
fit neatly within the statutory scheme" set forth in the NLRA. NLRB v. Yeshiva University,
444 U.S. 672, 680, 100 S. Ct. 856, 63 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980). Likewise, the Board has
recognized that a university, which relies so heavily on collegiality, "does not square with
the traditional authority structures with which this Act was designed to cope in the typical
organizations of the commercial world." Adelphi University, 195 NLRB at 648. The
obvious distinction here has been recognized by the Supreme Court and the Board: the
lecture hall is not the factory floor, and the "industrial model cannot be imposed blindly on
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the academic world." Syracuse University, 204 NLRB 641, 643 (1973); see also Yeshiva,
444 U.S. at 680.
Id. at 24. Miscimarra then expressed his disagreement with several particular aspects of the
Board’s decision. Miscimarra concluded, “For these reasons, and consistent with the Board's prior
holding in Brown University, I believe the Board should find that the relationship between
Columbia and the student assistants in the petitioned-for unit in this matter is primarily
educational, and that student assistants are not employees under Section 2(3) of the Act.” Id. at
34.
Unions representing graduate student employees have withdrawn pending NLRB petitions
and charges, and are not filing new petitions or charges, which would result in the NLRB not
having the opportunity to review and reverse or modify the Columbia University decision.
Therefore, it appears that there are not currently any pending cases before the NLRB that would
allow the NLRB to overrule Columbia University. However, it is possible that such a case could
reach the NLRB.

B. Bargaining Units
Yale Univ. & Unite Here Local 33, 365 N.L.R.B. 40 (2017); PCC Structurals, Inc., 365
N.L.R.B. 160 (2017)
Another area in which there has recently been significant change is in the standard for
determining the appropriate bargaining unit for collective bargaining. In Specialty Healthcare &
Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), the Board reviewed and clarified its
standards for making unit determinations when a representation petition is filed. However, in PCC
Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 15, 2017) the new Board overruled Specialty
Health Care, throwing into question recent decisions of the Board on bargaining units at colleges
and universities.
In Yale Univ. & Unite Here Local 33, 365 NLRB No. 40 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 22, 2017), the
NLRB applied the Specialty Healthcare standard and approved an election for graduate students
in nine separate units. Yale contended both that the graduate students were not employees,
asserting both that the Board’s earlier Columbia University decision was wrongly decided, and
alternatively even under that standard the graduate students were not employees.
At Yale, the union “filed nine petitions, each of which seeks to represent separate
bargaining units composed of all teaching fellows, discussion section leaders, part-time acting
instructors (PTAIs), associates in teaching, lab leaders, grader/tutors, graders without contact, and
teaching assistants (referred to collectively as teaching fellows) who teach in each of nine
departments at Yale University (Yale or the University). The nine separate units would include
teaching fellows in the following departments: English, East Asian Languages and Literature,
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History, History of Art, Political Science, Sociology, Physics, Geology and Geophysics, and
Mathematics.” Yale University, (01-RC183014) Boston MA (Reg. 1 Jan. 25, 2017).
The Regional Director summarized the standard used to determine whether a proposed unit
was appropriate.
In Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011),
enforced sub nom. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552 (6thCir.
2013), the Board set forth the standard to be applied when an employer contends that the
smallest appropriate unit contains employees who are not in the petitioned-for unit. When
a petitioned-for unit consists of employees who are readily identifiable as a group, and the
Board finds that the employees in the group share a community of interest after considering
the traditional criteria, the Board will find the petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit,
despite a contention that employees in the group could be placed in a larger unit which
would also be appropriate or even more appropriate, unless the party so contending
demonstrates that employees in the larger unit share an overwhelming community of
interest with those in the petitioned-for unit. Id. at 945-946.
Id. at 28-29.
Applying these standards, The Regional Director found that nine proposed units were
appropriate. The Regional Director rejected Yale’s argument that individual units were not
appropriate, and instead a university wide unit would be appropriate, explaining, “while a
university wide unit might also be appropriate, I find that Yale has failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that there is such an overwhelming community of interest among all of the teaching
fellows at the University that there is no rational basis for approving units based on academic
departments.” Id. at 36.
Yale filed a request for expedited review of the Regional Director's Decision and Direction
of Election, a request to stay the elections. Yale Univ. & Unite Here Local 33, 365 NLRB No. 40
(N.L.R.B. Feb. 22, 2017). The Board denied these requests. Miscimarra filed a dissent which
highlighted several disagreements with the Board’s current rulings and procedures. Miscimarra
addressed the issue of the appropriateness of the unit expressing his disagreement with the
Specialty Health care standard in general, and his view that “the instant case also gives rise to
questions regarding the appropriateness of applying the Board's Specialty Healthcare standard in
a university setting.”
On December 15, 2017, one day before Chairman Philip A. Miscimarra’s term on the board
expired, the Board issued PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (N.L.R.B. December 15,
2017), which overruled Specialty Healthcare and reinstated the prior community-of-interest
standard for determining an appropriate bargaining unit in union representation cases. Newly
appointed members Marvin E. Kaplan (R) and William J. Emanuel (R) joined Miscimarra in the
3-2 decision. This important decision was issued without the normal request for amicus briefs, and
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it was followed by a NLRB General Counsel Memorandum, OM 18-05, that specifies that
employers will be allowed to raise issues with previously determined or agreed to bargaining units.
On December 19, 2017, regional director Dennis Walsh, applied the Board’s new standard
to an election petition involving graduate students at the University of Pennsylvania. University of
Pennsylvania, 04-RC-199609 (NLRB Reg. 4, Dec. 19, 2017). The Regional Director outlined the
legal standard under PCC Structurals.
The Act requires only that a petitioner seek representation of employees in an
appropriate unit, not in the most appropriate unit possible. Overnite Transportation Co.,
322 NLRB 723 (1996). Thus, the Board first determines whether the unit proposed by a
petitioner is appropriate. When the Board determines that the employees in the unit sought
by a petitioner share a community of interest, the Board must next evaluate whether the
interests of that group are “sufficiently distinct from those of other [excluded] employees
to warrant establishment of a separate unit.” PCC Structurals, 365 NLRB No. 160, slip op.
at 7 (Dec. 15, 2017) quoting Wheeling Island Gaming, 355 NLRB 637, 642 fn. 2 (2010)
(emphasis in original). Specifically, the inquiry is whether “’excluded employees have
meaningfully distinct interests in the context of collective bargaining that outweigh
similarities with unit members.’” PCC Structurals, supra, slip op. at 11, quoting
Constellation Brands, U.S. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 842 F.3d 784, 794 (2d Cir. 2016). In
making this assessment, PCC Structurals instructs the decision-maker to assess [w]hether
the employees are organized into a separate department; have distinct skills and training;
have distinct job functions and perform distinct work, including inquiry into the amount
and type of job overlap between classifications; are functionally integrated with the
Employer’s other employees; have frequent contact with other employees; interchange
with other employees; have distinct terms and conditions of employment; and are
separately supervised. Id., slip op. at 5 (quoting United Operations, Inc., 338 NLRB 123,
123 (2002). Particularly important in considering whether the unit sought is appropriate are
the organization of the facility and the utilization of skills. Gustave Fisher, Inc., 256 NLRB
1069, 1069 fn. 5 (1981). However, all relevant factors must be weighed in determining
community of interest.
Id. at 21.
Applying these standards, Walsh directed that students from the business and engineering
schools — who were previously excluded — must also be included in the bargaining unit:
based on the record and relevant Board cases, including the Board’s recently minted
decision in PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017) overturning
Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), enfd.
727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013), I find, in agreement with the Employer, that a unit limited to
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graduate student employees in the seven petitioned-for schools is not appropriate, and that
to constitute an appropriate unit it must also include graduate students in both the Wharton
School and the School of Engineering and Applied Science because the interests of the
former group are not sufficiently distinct from those of the latter group to warrant a separate
unit.
Id. at 2.
In February 2018 the union in the University of Pennsylvania case withdrew its election
petition and therefore the Board will not address the bargaining unit standard in this case.
C. NLRB Elections
NLRB Election Rules, 29 CFR Parts 101, 102, and 103; Request for Information
Regarding Representation Election Regulations, RIN 3142-AA12 (NLRB Dec. 14, 2017)
In December 2014 the NLRB issued revisions to union election rules that vastly simplified
and expedited the election process. However, this election rule may be retracted or changed by the
new Board based on a recent Request for Information.
On December 15, 2014, the Board published the Election Rule, which amended the Board’s
prior Election Regulations. 79 Fed. Reg. 74308 (2014). The Election Rule was adopted after
public comment periods in which tens of thousands of public comments were received. The Rule
was approved by a three-member Board majority, with two Board members dissenting. Thereafter,
the Rule was submitted for review by Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In
March 2015, majorities in both houses of Congress voted in favor of a joint resolution disapproving
the Board’s rule and declaring that it should have no force or effect. President Obama vetoed this
resolution on March 31, 2015. The amendments adopted by the final rule became effective on
April 14, 2015, and have been applicable to all representation cases filed on or after that date.
Lawsuits challenging the facial validity of the Election Rule were rejected with the Courts finding
that the changes were not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate federal statutes or the
Constitution. See Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 215, 218
(5th Cir. 2016) (The “rule, on its face, does not violate the National Labor Relations Act or the
Administrative Procedure Act[.]”); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v.
NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 3d 171, 220 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting claims that the Final Rule contravenes
either the NLRA or the Constitution or is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of the Board’s
discretion).
The 2014 Election Rule includes the following: Provides for electronic filing and
transmission of election petitions and other documents; Ensures that employees, employers and
unions receive timely information they need to understand and participate in the representation
case process; Eliminates or reduces unnecessary litigation, duplication and delay; Adopts best
practices and uniform procedures across regions; Requires that additional contact information
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(personal telephone numbers and email addresses) be included in voter lists, to the extent that
information is available to the employer, in order to enhance information sharing by permitting
other parties to the election to communicate with voters about the election; and Allows parties to
consolidate all election-related appeals to the Board into a single appeals process. Cumulatively,
these changes will likely reduce the time from the filing of a representation petition to the holding
of an election to between 10 and 20 days.
Some of the new provisions are particularly important for faculty members. For example,
the new election rules also require that employers provide the union with personal email addresses
and phone numbers for employees. This is particularly important for reaching out to contingent
faculty, who often perform most of their work off campus. Also, parties must be aware that the
NLRB representation hearing and election process is extremely fast paced and the NLRB will
rarely grant requests for extensions of time. Therefore, parties should be fully aware of the revised
rules and prepared for the hearing and election process prior to filing any election petition with the
NLRB.
However, a recent Request for Information issued by the Board indicates the Board may
modify or rescind the 2014 election rule. On December 14, 2017, the National Labor Relations
Board published a Request for Information in the Federal Register, asking for public input
regarding the Board’s 2014 Election Rule, which modified the Board’s representation-election
procedures located at 29 CFR parts 101 and 102. The Board sought information from interested
parties regarding three questions:
1. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained without change?
2. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained with modifications? If so, what should be
modified?
3. Should the 2014 Election Rule be rescinded? If so, should the Board revert to the
Representation Election Regulations that were in effect prior to the 2014 Election Rule’s
adoption, or should the Board make changes to the prior Representation Election
Regulations? If the Board should make changes to the prior Representation Election
Regulations, what should be changed?
Responses to this request were originally due on February 12, 2018, but the deadline was
subsequently extended to Wednesday, April 18, 2018.
The Request for Information was approved by former Board Chairman Philip A.
Miscimarra and Board Members Marvin E. Kaplan (now Chairman) and William J. Emanuel.
Board Members Mark Gaston Pearce and Lauren McFerran dissented. The majority noted that the
request “does not suggest even a single specific change in current representation election
procedures.” Id. at 3. However, member McFerren in a dissent argued that “the nature and timing
of this [request], along with its faulty justifications, suggests that the majority’s interest lies . . . in
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manufacturing a rationale for a subsequent rollback of the Rule in light of the change in the
composition of the Board.” Id. at 11.
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